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Religious Fundamentalism and Legal Systems:
Methods and Rationales in the Fight to Control the
Political Apparatus
ANDREW PAINE*
Religious fundamentalism has become a worldwide phenomenon. While
many contend that fundamentalist movements only exist in North American
Protestantism and in Middle Eastern Islam, fundamentalist groups can be
found in every region of the globe and among all of the world's religions. In
addition to becoming a global phenomenon, fundamentalist groups exert
considerable social, cultural, and political pressure within the nations they
inhabit. Shiite Islamic fundamentalists in Iran and the Christian Coalition in
the United States are only two examples of fundamentalist groups that have
risen to prominence in their nations.
In this note, I will explore one narrow aspect of religious fundamentalist
movements, namely the relationship between fundamentalists and legal
systems. This note will seek to uncover why fundamentalists believe they
must control the fashioning of law and legal systems within the societies they
inhabit. In addition, I will explore why fundamentalists feel it is imperative
that laws be crafted by them and not by other groups within their societies. In
short, I will explore why fundamentalists feel they need law, and why they feel
law needs fundamentalists.
To answer these questions and obtain a grasp of a wide range of
fundamentalist movements, I will present three case studies: the Jewish
haredim in Israel; the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; and the Buddhist
fundamentalists in Sri Lanka. By examining these movements, it becomes
apparent that the reasons fundamentalists become interested in legal systems
and the methods they use to control them are dictated first by the precepts of
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the religion they follow, and most importantly, by where they view themselves
existing within the societies they inhabit.
I. A DEFINITION OF FUNDAMENTALISM
Before embarking on an analysis of the relationship between
fundamentalists and legal systems, it is necessary to define what *a
fundamentalist movement is and to understand the forces that create it. The
term fundamentalist often carries a negative connotation. Many scholars and
the public-at-large often paint fundamentalists as maniacal, wholly
unreasonable religious fanatics who remind us of our unenlightened past.'
Fundamentalists are not unreasonable or crazy. Many scientists, professors,
and other extremely educated and well-respected people are members of
fundamentalist sects.2 In order to understand fundamentalists, it is necessary
to dispel the myths and preconceived notions and to see fundamentalists for
what they are-modern people trying to cope with modernization.
In their essence, fundamentalist movements are a religious response to
modernity. Most scholars see the first major expression of modernity in the
Enlightenment, when thinkers rejected centralized and divinely sanctioned
authority and instead relied on critical reason? They looked not to religion but
to science and material progress which would bring an inevitable modern
secular era, an era that honored human reason over superstition.' Most
importantly, the secular rationalists stressed individualism over community.
For the secular rationalists, human reason and experimentation were superior
to all other forms of knowledge.' They held that a culture of critical reason
should dominate hierarchical and centralized authority. Many of the
assumptions held by these secular rationalists influenced the policies of the
colonizing powers of the West and persist to this day in the way Westerners
and liberal governments think of themselves.6
Because fundamentalists focus on tradition, many people believe that
fundamentalists are not modern, but instead are dinosaurs fighting to return the
1. See MARTIN MARTY & R. SCOTr APPLEBY, THE GLORY AND THE POWER: THE FUNDAMENTALIST
CHALLENGE TO THE MODERN WORLD 3 (1992).
2. See id. at 14.
3. See id. at 11.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 15.
6. Id. at I!.
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world to a bygone age. To be modern is different from being a modernist. To
be modem is to experience personal and social life in a maelstrom, to have
one's world in constant flux, ambiguity, and contradiction.7 Fundamentalists,
like all other modems, recognize that they exist in this maelstrom, and that
their identity is constantly shifting. For fundamentalists and all moderns, there
is a gap between where they are and where they want to be.8 This maelstrom
known as modernity can best be described in terms of increasing levels of
differentiation in society. In other words, as a society develops and
experiences modernization, its various institutions become more clearly
articulated. Its systems become more complex and interdependent.9 However,
problems arise when society and culture do not develop equally. If the two
systems are no longer aligned, the society may experience such problems as
uneven economic growth and extreme bouts of inflation and deflation.'"
Fundamentalism is a way of combating and coping with the uneven social and
cultural development modernization inevitably brings. Fundamentalists
anchor themselves to a selected set of religious fundamentals or precepts in an
attempt to battle the maelstrom. Fundamentalists differ from modernists in
that modernists make themselves at home in the maelstrom. They try to make
its currents their own as they search for truth and reason."
The religious precepts on which a fundamentalist movement chooses to
focus are in large part dictated by the path modernism has taken in its
community. Fundamentalism is a reaction to a perceived crisis. 2  It is
impossible for any religious movement to give every religious text or event
equal emphasis. Fundamentalists pick those religious precepts that are going
to best enable them to keep their enemies at a distance and keep their people
together, In short, they pick ideas that will best combat modernism. 3
7. MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF MODERNITY 345
(1982).
8. BRUCE LAWRENCE, DEFENDERS OF GOD: THE FUNDAMENTALIST REVOLT AGAINST THE MODERN
AGE 1 (1989).
9. See id. at 2.
10. Winston Davis, Fundamentalism in Japan: Religious and Political, in FUNDAMENTALISMS
OBSERVED 782, 784 (Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1992). FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED is part
of a six volume compilation of essays on religious fundamentalism put together as part of the
Fundamentalism Project sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Because of its breadth
and its contributions from many renowned writers, the series is considered the premiere source of
information on religious fundamentalism.
11. See BERMAN, supra note 7, at 345-46.
12. John Voll, Fundamentalism In The Sunni Arab World, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, supra
note 10, at 345, 365.
13. See MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 1, at 25.
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Observers often confuse fundamentalists with religious conservatives or
orthodox believers. Traditionalists or orthodox communities try to keep
modernism at bay by wrapping themselves in a religious cocoon. 4
Fundamentalists, however, fight back against modernism. Instead of simply
protecting themselves, fundamentalists want to reclaim a place in their society
that they feel has been taken from them. They want to actively ensure their
future in a world of their own defining."
As we have seen, fundamentalists are products of the modem world. It is
impossible to speak of pre-modem fundamentalists because the pre-modern era
lacked the forces against which fundamentalists are fighting. 6 What makes
each fundamentalist movement unique is that each nation, in fact each
community of people, has been exposed to modernity at different times and in
different forms. Because modernism has touched all regions of the globe,
fundamentalism has become a global phenomenon. Like other reactions to
modernity, fundamentalism has cut across racial, ethnic, and religious lines
and is now found in every region of the world.
II. THE HAREDIM IN ISRAEL
Hidden in the shadow of the Middle Eastern peace process boils another
conflict This conflict is not between Arabs and Israelis, but is between secular
and ultra-Orthodox Jews. The ultra-Orthodox Jews, or haredim, have
increasingly exerted pressure on the secular Jewish community in an attempt
to make secular Jews conform to their traditionalist mandates.' To limit their
exposure to the profane outside world, the haredim quickly try to turn their
neighborhoods into enclaves of Jewish traditionalism, limiting all behavior that
is not in strict adherence to the laws of Judaism. Haredim have been known
to stop traffic and spit on people who attempt to offend their celebration of the
Sabbath by driving through haredi neighborhoods. Many secular Jews are
moving out of the holy city of Jerusalem because of harassment from the
haredim, and some fear the city will become a bastion of ultra-Orthodox
power.' 9 It might not take long for the haredim to take over. Their birthrate
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id.
16. LAWRENCE, supra note 8, at 2-3.
17. See Joseph Contreras, Laying Claim to Jerusalem, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1996, at 32.
18. Id.
19. Id:
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is three times that of secular Jews, and already fifty-five percent of
kindergartners in state-run schools in Jerusalem are ultra-Orthodox.0 As the
haredim continue to grow, it is important to understand the possible political
ramifications their rise to power could bring.
The term haredim is not used to describe a single monolithic organization
like the Muslim Brotherhood, but instead represents a number of diverse
subgroups. Each of these groups is led by a different charismatic leader, and
each has a slightly different view on political and theological matters.2' While
they may disagree on interpretation, all haredi Jews agree that the only
response to God's word is total devotion to it. This devotion is best expressed
by studying the word of God in the Torah and in the rabbinical commentaries,
especially the Talmud.'
In Hebrew the term haredim means those who tremble at the word of
God. 3 However, the haredim do not use this name to describe themselves.
They most often call themselves erlicher Yidn, Yiddish for "virtuous Jews".'
They do not see themselves as a separate sect of Judaism, but as the special
group of Jews that has stayed with the true faith while the rest of Judaism has
departed. The haredim stress two central themes. First and foremost, they
stress tradition. For the haredim what is new can never be as good as what
came before. To them their ancestors will always be better than they and what
their ancestors did must serve as a model of how life should be lived.
Secondly, the haredim all share a fear that Judaism will not be able to survive
under the pressures of modernism.2' They see themselves in an endless battle
to hold back the modem world. They look around at the catastrophes of
secular culture and fear for the survival of the Jewish faith.2
Orthodox movements in Judaism began in Europe during the eighteenth
century in response to-the forces of industrialization and urbanization that were
sweeping across Europe. 8 In industrial societies, traditions were considered
20. Id.
21. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note I, at 95.
22. Id.
23. SAMUAL HEILMAN, DEFENDERS OF THE FAITH: INSIDE ULTRA-ORTHODOX JEWRY 12 (1992). The
term haredim appears in the book of Isaiah which reads: "Hear the word of the Lord, you who tremble
[haredim] at His word." Isaiah 66:5.
24. HEILMAN, supra note 23, at 12.
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 14.
28. Id.
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outdated and faith was expected to give way to reason. People began to think
of themselves as individuals and not as members of a tribe or religious group.29
Industrialization and urbanization provided new opportunities, causing many
Jews to leave the traditional communities. This movement came to be known
as the emancipation." The Jews who left quickly realized there was a moral
cost in leaving their enclosed communities. In order to enter mainstream
society, they had to diminish their Jewish identity, or at least make it
secondary. Many shed their Jewish identity altogether while others tried to
find some middle ground that would allow them to be loyal citizens and
maintain old religious ties."
The maskilim, or enlightened Jews, selected this middle road. The
maskilim promoted cultural contact without complete absorption. 2 Practically
this meant becoming literate in the language of the host society, having friends
outside the Jewish community, and perhaps pursuing a profession that was not
strictly Jewish.3 The maskilim ideal was expressed by a popular aphorism of
the time, "[b]e a person when you go out in the street and a Jew in your
home. '34
Contra-acculturation Orthodox Jews rejected the distinction between life
in the street and life at home. They asserted that one had to always remain
fully a Jew.3' They believed that even the partial assimilation of the maskilim
was a forewarning of complete assimilation. Dual identity eventually steered
Jews toward the ultimate evil-complete absorption.' Intertwined with this
belief was Orthodox pessimism concerning the ability of Judaism to survive
in the face of the outside world. The Orthodox believed that if Judaism and
the outside culture were to come into contact, Judaism would lose unless one
was diligent in his or her protection of the traditions.37 The Orthodox often
pointed to the Book of Leviticus where God warned the Israelites that those
29. Samual C. Heilman & Menachem Friedman, Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Jews, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, supra note 10, at 197, 200.
30. See id.
31. HEILMAN, supra note 23, at 15.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 15-16.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 17.
36. Id.
37. Id.
[Vol. 5:263
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
who strayed from the ancient ways "shall be lost among the goyim, and the
land of your enemies shall eat you up."3
For these Jews, the particulars of Jewish practice constituted the shield by
which they kept modernism at bay. Ritual, reading of the Jewish texts, and
observance of ceremonial custom were not peripheral aspects of Judaism, but
were the very core of what it meant to be Jewish. 9 In addition to these efforts
at a positive culture, the contra-acculturationists worked most vigorously to
construct barriers between themselves and the outside world. They created a
school system to keep their impressionable youth out of non-Jewish schools.4
They did not speak the language of the country they lived in and they refused
to wear fashionable clothes.4 They maintained the idea that they were the
chosen people and that they should be separated from the other nations. Jews
had to remember that they were still in exile."
While the forerunners of the haredim were fractured during the debates
between Hasidism and Misnagdim in the nineteenth century, the two groups
resolved their differences in the early twentieth century so that they could
battle against the large number of Jews who were leaving the fold and
assimilating into the larger culture.4 Both Hasidic and Misnagdic movements
believed that Jewish culture was superior to anything that non-Jewish
contemporary culture could offer. The conviction that a culture shaped by the
nonreligious could provide nothing of value to Judaism was to be the
cornerstone of contra-acculturationist thinking. In 1912, various European
Orthodox groups came together to form a political union called Agudat
Israel.44 While Agudat Isreal did not pretend to be a political party, it did
provide an opportunity for Orthodox leaders to come together and share ideas
on combating secularity." The contra-acculturationist community was now for
the most part united, and it was possible to speak of a group called the
haredim.
38. Id; Leviticus 26:38.
39. HEILMAN, supra note 23, at 18.
40. See id. at 19.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 25-26. For a description of the Hasidic and Misnagdic movements see generally Heilman
& Friedman, supra note 29, at 206-210. While both groups are now indistinguishable to many, it is still
possible to talk of haredim that follow Hasidic or Misnagdic teachings. Id.
44. HEILMAN, supra note 23, at 27.
45. See id.
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As the twentieth century progressed, two events influenced the haredim
perhaps more than any others: modern secular Zionism and the Holocaust.46
Haredi Jews are vehemently opposed to the notion of a Jewish state founded
without divine intervention. The haredim believe that the state of Israel
transgresses the commandment in Jeremiah: "[u]nto Babylon shall they be
carried and there should remain until the day I think of them, says the Lord."47
To the haredim, the secular Jewish state is a heretical rebellion against the
kingdom of God. The Zionists are seeking to hasten the end of the exile
through their own sinful actions and not by the work of God.48 The haredim
also oppose secular Zionism because it reduces the Jews to a common nation
like any other and removes some of their unique status as God's people. 9
The Holocaust had perhaps the most devastating effect on the haredim
Because the haredim stressed not assimilating into the wider culture, they were
easier for the Nazis to target. Entire haredi enclaves were decimated
throughout Eastern Europe." The Holocaust forced the haredim out of their
traditional neighborhoods that had been the centers of their cultural and
religious lives. While they may not have agreed with the idea of a secular
Jewish state, Palestine was the safest place for the haredim. In Palestine, one
could be more haredi than any place else.2 The death and dislocation of the
Holocaust, together with the Zionist fervor that overtook Judaism after the
formation of Israel in 1948, only made the haredim stronger in their
convictions. Preservation of tradition in the face of all this adversity became
more and more the moving force behind the haredim3
In the late 1940s, the haredim who immigrated to Palestine were forced to
make some difficult political decisions concerning the new Israeli state.
Agudat Israel remained the dominant political voice for the haredirn in the
Jewish community, but was unsure of what position to take toward the
Zionists.' The reactionary group Neturei Karta refused to have any dealings
with the new state, going so far as not voting in elections.5 Agudat Israel did
46. See id. at 29.
47. Jeremiah 27:22.
48. HEILMAN, supra note 23, at 29.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 33.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id.
54. Heilman & Friedman, supra note 29, at 234.
55. Id. at 234, 262-63 & n.66.
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not feel it could go that far. The leaders of the group reasoned that only as part
of the political system could they fight against attacks on orthodoxy. Agudat
Israel moved from a political action group to a political party.
Agudat Israel's a-Zionist stance worked very well. They received
concessions from the government safeguarding the Sabbath as a day of rest,
providing religious education as an alternative to state-run schools, and
receiving military service exemptions for students in the yeshivas-the
haredim-run religious schools." One demand that Agudat Israel never pursued
was the implementation of Jewish law as the legal system of Israel." While
all the religious parties have paid lip service to the notion of a state ruled in
accordance with Jewish law, they all realize that implementing such a system
would be impossible. Even if Agudat Israel and the other religious parties
were ever to garner enough votes, the application of Jewish law to a modem
state would require so much interpretation and so many changes that many
rabbinical leaders have shied away from the project. 9
Just as Agudat Israel was beginning to dominate the haredi political scene,
in the 1980s the party fractured.' The Hasidic and the Mesnagdic elements
of the haredim had once again come into conflict. The Hasidic Lubavitch
movement had for the first time put its support solidly behind Agudat Israel."
This swing toward Hasidism alienated the Mesnagdic elements of the party,
resulting in the formation of the Degel Ha Torah Party. 2 In addition, during
the 1950s, many Jews from Muslim countries immigrated to Israel. Many of
the Sephardi Jews were pulled toward the haredi way of life and many became
part of Ashkenazic Jewish communities.' In the early 1980s, the Sephardi
Jews split from Agudat Israel and formed their own political party, Shas.' By
the election of 1988, there were three different parties representing haredi
interests. In addition, many young, radical haredi Jews voted for the pro-
Zionist National Religious Party which was heavily supported by the pro-
Zionist fundamentalist group, Gush Emunim. 65
56. Id. at 235.
57. Id.
58. Charles S. Liebman, Jewish Fundamentalism and the Israeli Polity, in FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE
STATE 68, 74 (Martin Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993).
59. Id.
60. Heilman & Friedman, supra note 29, at 247.
61. Id. at 247-48.
62. See id. at 249.
63. Id. at 244-45.
64. Id. at 246.
65. Id. at 250. For a discussion of the Gush Emunim movement see Gideon Aran, Jewish Zionist
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Primarily, the haredim are not concerned with large national issues but
with protecting themselves from outside culture. This is often best achieved
not through national politics but through local, extra-political action. The
haredim want to surround and squeeze the non-haredi elements out of their
neighborhoods.' They pick non-Orthodox inhabitants or institutions and then
wage a war of attrition that includes economic sanctions and violent
harassment until they leave the neighborhood."7 For instance, the haredim
once tried to close Sabbath Square in Jerusalem on the Sabbath because it
bordered the haredi neighborhood of Mea Shearim."
There are several reasons the haredim are more apt to participate in local
political or extra-political activities as opposed to becoming swept up in the
national political melee. First and foremost are religious concerns. The
haredim believe that God alone can redeem his chosen people from exile. It
is heresy to believe that man can create the Jewish homeland, and that any
group that tries is offending God and his direct edicts. As a result of this
belief, the haredim must walk a fine line in their dealings with the secular
Jewish state. While some haredim allow no contact with the Jewish state,
most haredim in Israel have come to the conclusion that some interaction is
necessary, but only in defense of their interests. The haredim generally feel
that the extent of their political action should be solely in defense of their
interests.
Furthermore, the haredim shun involvement with modern secular culture
because they are worried that it will overwhelm them. Because they are
pessimistic about the ability of traditional Judaism to withstand the onslaught
of modernism, they have adopted an enclave mentality. While some
fundamentalist groups seek to mold the world in their image, the haredim are
simply trying to protect themselves. There is no requirement that they must
go out and prepare the world for the coming of the Messiah; they must simply
wait and hold true to their traditions.
The measures that the haredim took in the wake of the no confidence vote
of 1990 provide an excellent example of their narrow political goals. On
March 15, the Knesset passed a no confidence vote against the government of
Fundamentalism: The Bloc of the Faithful in Israel, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, supra note 10, at
265.
66. Heilman & Friedman, supra note 29, at 239.
67. Id. See also Contreras, supra note 17, at 32 (discussing examples of haredi pressure tactics).
68. Heilman & Friedman, supra note 29, at 240.
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the Likud Party led by Prime Minister Shamir.' As the bargaining continued,
the eighteen votes held by religious parties became the swing votes. Shimon
Peres and the Labor Party needed to secure six of the eighteen votes from the
religious parties to form a narrow government.7 Prime Minister Shamir
needed thirteen of the votes to form his government." While most of Israel
viewed this election as a vote to determine the direction of the Middle East
peace process, the haredi parties saw the impasse as an opportunity to secure
more of their defensive religious goals. Agudat Israel was swayed by promises
from Shamir that the government would create a religious radio station,
establish laws on the sale of pork products, and establish a joint committee to
study decreasing Sabbath desecration."2 The leaders of Degal Ha Torah issued
a statement that the rest of the world would make Israel give up the West Bank
and Gaza despite Israel's efforts; therefore, the issue was moot. Degal Ha
Torah joined the Likud party simply because they believed that the Labor
Party was less in line with Jewish law."' According to many observers the
haredi parties had an excellent opportunity to influence the course of the
Israeli government, but they instead pursued their own defensive religious
goals.74
The haredim also maintain purely pragmatic concerns about political
involvement. They are significantly outnumbered by the secular majority,
only fifteen percent of Israel's 4.5 million Jewish citizens identify themselves
as haredi." The haredim always live in fear of a secular backlash if their
demands become too extreme. They realize their government subsidies and
military exemptions exist at the will of the state and could be wiped out at any
time the majority sees fit. In fact, in 1988, when the number of seats held by
religious parties in the Knesset increased from thirteen to eighteen, many
secular Israelis became worried and called for the curtailing of special
privileges for the haredim. Israeli newspapers warned about the impending
religious take-over of the school system and the censorship of the press. 6 In
addition to fearing a majority backlash, the haredim also share a strong belief
69. Liebman, supra note 58, at 82.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 83.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 85.
75. Contreras, supra note 17, at 32.
76. Liebman, supra note 58, at 77.
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in Jewish unity." While they may have their own personal goals for their
communities, it is important that the Israeli state as a whole stay together and
united. Often it is better to preserve peace than to press for further political
concessions.
The political future of the haredim could be changing. As mentioned in
the opening paragraph of this section, the haredim are growing and are
increasingly taking over the city of Jerusalem. It is possible that early in the
next century the haredim may be able to take control of the city and dominate
its city government. Much will depend on whether the haredim will choose
to work within the current city structure, or as is more likely, they will try to
break down that structure and form a society more in line with Jewish law.
More importantly, will the Israeli government allow them to do it, or will the
haredim be a religious majority prohibited by conviction from touching the
city government that rules them?
III. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT
The Muslim Brotherhood, or al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, more than any other
Islamic organization, has been the ideological and institutional center of
fundamentalism in the Arab world.' The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in
1928 by Hasan al-Banna, an elementary school teacher who was ashamed of
the moral degradation sweeping Egypt and the Arab world. 9 In its infancy, the
Brotherhood was a purely religious society. Its members formed Islamic
societies, published Islamic newspapers, and preached to the public.' Its goals
were to raise the youth in line with proper Islamic ethics and to spread the
merits of Muhammadan prophecy including moral virtues, chastity, and good
social relations."s The full extent of its political activism is in its network of
social welfare services. The Brotherhood created schools for girls and boys
as well as trade schools for adults. 2 It provided assistance to displaced rural
77. Id. at 76-77.
78. R. HRAIR DEKMEJIAN, ISLAM IN REVOLUTION: FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 73 (2d ed.
1995).
79. MARRY & APPLEBY, supra note 1, at 148-49.
80. Abdel Azim Ramadan, Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups, in FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE STATE, supra note 58, at 152, 154.
81. Id.
82. Voll, supra note 12, at 361.
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immigrants in urban areas, going beyond what the government agencies or Suf!
brotherhoods provided."
With the passage of time and its increased activism, the Brotherhood was
required to better define its ideology on a number of issues. Over time the
ideology of al-Banna and the Brotherhood evolved to include these elements:
first, the oneness of the religious world and the lay world; second, the belief
in pan-Islamism in the face of secular nationalism; and third, the establishment
of an Islamic government as its final goal." The goal of establishing an
Islamic government was certainly not radical in Islamic thought. In Islam,
unlike Christianity, the separation of faith (din) from the state (dawlah) is
unacceptable." The shari'ah is the will and law of Allah as expressed in the
Qur 'an and the sunnah.' The sunnah is the recorded practices of the Prophet
Muhammad which are used as exemplars of how Allah's will and law should
be applied."' The shari'ah is a complete scheme of life. It deals not only with
the believer's relationship to Allah but with the relationship among believers
as well.8
While the shari 'ah does appear to be a fixed set of divinely revealed laws,
as a social code it is designed to be adaptable in varying times and places.
Islamic jurists did recognize the validity of equity and custom where they did
not contravene the shari'ah. Through the process of ijtihad, where qualified
jurists or mujahids deduced the law from various sources, custom and local
preference could be incorporated into Islamic law.89 As a result, Islamic law
was often different among various religious sects and among people from
various regions.
As the Muslim Brotherhood became more popular and solidified its
ideology behind al-Banna, it was ready to pursue its goal of an Islamic state
based on the shari'ah. The Brotherhood soon had become the first Islamic
organization to appear in modern Egypt with the goal of seizing power.'
According to al-Banna, it was a religious crime not to become involved in
politics.9 The Brotherhood shifted its activities from the religious centers and
83. Id.
84. Ramadan, supra note 80, at 155.
85. DEKMEJIAN, supra note 78, at 41.
86. See DAVIS WAINES, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 243-44 (1995).
87. See id. at 288.
88. Id. at 243.
89. Id. at 83-85.
90. Ramadan, supra note 80, at 155.
91. Id.
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its work among the poor to the secular universities and the educated elite. 2 It
no longer looked to religious leaders to lead Egypt to an Islamic state, but
instead looked to Egypt's educated middle and upper classes.93 The
Brotherhood came to believe that only its return to the political field would
lead to a revival of the Islamic nation. It traced the causes of Egypt's social,
economic, and political problems to the government's failure to apply the
shari'ah.' AI-Da 'wa, the Brotherhood's newspaper decreed, "[r]eturn to the
rule of God. Nothing else you have will ever save you, only this and nothing
else." '
However, al-Banna did not advocate the violent overthrow of the
government.' The fact that Sunni legal theory lacked an explicit doctrine of
revolution was of great influence to al-Banna.7 The Sunni ulama had
counseled obedience to the state while limiting jihad to non-Islamic foes."
AI-Banna believed that the transformation of society had to come from the
people and organizations within society, not from armed revolution." While
al-Banna acknowledged that the power to transform came from political
power, he insisted that the Brotherhood stood for social reform and not the
direct exercise of political might."°
During World War II, the Brotherhood led massive demonstrations against
government corruption and the British occupation.' Relations between the
government and the Brotherhood became increasingly tense as the two sides
competed for popular influence."° The conflict boiled over in 1948 when
Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha, sensing the increasing influence and
radicalization of the Brotherhood, attempted to dissolve the group and detained
its most important leaders.' 3  Brotherhood radicals struck back by
assassinating the prime minister. In 1949, al-Banna was murdered in
retaliation.'" Hasan al-Hudaybi took over as the Supreme Guide of the
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Brotherhood and quickly allied himself with several young officers in the
military who were planning to overthrow the government.' In 1952, the Free
Officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, with whom al-Hudaybi had allied, took
control of Egypt.'"
Nasser wanted to mobilize all of Egyptian society from top to bottom. He
wanted to free the country of colonialism and make it a modern nation. °" For
Nasser, mobilizing society required first and foremost that all dissident voices
be silenced. As a result, in January of 1953, he outlawed all political parties.1°8
In the beginning, the Brotherhood had supported Nasser but, increasingly,
tensions mounted. Nasser was anxious for the support of the Brethren during
the revolution, but now they could only be a thorn in his side. In October of
1954, a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser.'" The
assassination attempt gave Nasser the excuse he needed to wipe out the group.
Its headquarters were burned down, and its leaders were arrested and tortured.
Six of the leaders were hanged from the gallows."' The arrests and
executions abruptly ended twenty-five years of increasing influence and
political activism.
The imprisonment of the Brotherhood's leaders sent the movement
underground. In the prisons a rift developed within the Brotherhood's
leadership. AI-Hudaybi and the older leadership of the Brotherhood continued
to advocate a nonrevolutionary strategy."' The younger members of the group
began to gravitate to a new, more radical leader, Sayyid Qutb."'  In 1964,
Qutb and many of the remaining leaders were released from prison,
presumably to exert right wing pressure on the radical left in Egypt who
wanted Nasser to go further in his policy of socialization." 3 Soon after his
release, Qutb began plotting Nasser's assassination and the overthrow of the
government with his cadre of young radicals. However, their plot was
discovered. Qutb was executed and many more people were imprisoned. ' 4
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Qutb's death resulted in the splintering of the radical wing of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Many of his followers went off to form their own organizations,
collectively called the Takfir Groups." 5
In 1970, Nasser died and Anwar al-Sadat came to power." 6 Sadat wanted
to liberalize the country and tear down the socialist apparatus Nasser had
constructed, but he needed help." 7 In an effort to gain support for his
programs and to overwhelm Nasser's supporters, Sadat released the Muslim
Brethren from prison."' In order to hold the support of the Islamic
traditionalists, Sadat attempted to stress the Islamic legitimacy of the state.
Most importantly, Sadat identified the shari'ah as one source of legislation." 9
While Sadat was not ready to make the shari'ah the sole source of legislation,
his stand did go a long way initially in encouraging the Brethren. 2'
The older leadership had suffered greatly under Nasser's regime and they
had learned from their collisions with the government in 1954 and 1965.1
The Brotherhood was determined to avoid making the same mistakes again-a
new pragmatism characterized the organization. The leaders spoke out more
forcibly against the violent overthrow of the government." The Brotherhood
stood against wrecking the foundations of the government because it would
destroy the property of the people. Violent clashes with the authorities wasted
the people's efforts and ultimately only benefited the enemies of the nation."
In the Sadat era, the Brotherhood attempted to work within mainstream
political channels to achieve its goals. In 1976, Salih Abu Ruqayaq, a
prominent leader in the Brotherhood became General Secretary in the ruling
Center Party.24 Later that year, six Brotherhood members were selected in the
new multiparty elections to serve in the People's Assembly. They also were
chosen to hold positions of leadership in the Center Party and in the
Assembly.'25 In the short time since their release from prison, the leaders of
the Muslim Brotherhood had come to exert significant political power. Still,
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the Brotherhood continued to be an illegal organization that existed in the open
only as long as Sadat allowed it.
In the early 1980s, the Brotherhood embarked on an ambitious new plan
to solidify its leadership among the Islamic organizations. It formed the
Permanent Islamic Congress for the Propagation of Islam which encouraged
the Takfir Groups and the Muslim Brotherhood to come together for a
dialogue on political and social issues. 26 The formation of the Congress
scared Sadat because he believed that the Muslim Brotherhood was radical.
Relations between Sadat and the Brotherhood were already strained over
Sadat's agreement with Israel in the Camp David Accords. In an attempt to
head off a feared Islamic takeover, Sadat arrested the leaders of all the Islamic
groups and put them in prison.'2
When Sadat was murdered in 1981, the new president Hosni Mubarak
released most of the Islamic dissidents except those who were associated with
Sadat's assassination.'28 Once out of prison, the Brotherhood assumed an
increasingly active role in Egyptian politics and society. In 1984, the
Brotherhood joined the New Wafd Party for the national elections.'29 The
coalition won sixty-five of 450 seats in the People's Assembly to become the
largest opposition group. 3 In 1987, the Brotherhood joined the Socialist
Labor Party and the Liberal Party, further solidifying its power by combining
with the two other parties. 3' The Brotherhood was still not a legal
organization, but with careful alliances with legal political parties the
Brotherhood became the largest single opposition group to the Egyptian
government.'32 In both elections, the Brotherhood ran on a platform that
centered around the implementation of the shari'ah as the main source of
legislation. In addition to this core demand, it called for the Islamitization of
the mass media and of the educational institutions.'33 For the first time, the
Brotherhood experienced political success as a group. In 1976, the
Brotherhood relied on the personalities of particular candidates, but in 1984
and 1987 it drew votes based on its religious platform.'"
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The political goals of the Muslim Brotherhood have been dictated in great
measure by the fact that it is an Islamic organization. All Islamic groups that
claim to be following the precepts of Islam would actively advocate the
formation of a government that was predicated on the shari'ah. While every
Islamic fundamentalist group calls for the return to the shari'ah, each group
advocates different tactics to reach this goal. It is important to remember that
Islam does allow some flexibility in interpreting the divine law through the
process of itihad. Ijtihad allows competing fundamentalist groups to
construct different paths to the same goal. While both the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups agree that Egypt's government must be
brought back to the shari'ah, they do not agree on how it should be
accomplished.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups believe it is the ultimate
objective of Islam to include the entire world under the law of Allah.' In
order to implement the shari'ah worldwide, it is necessary to engage in fihad
to overcome the nonbelievers.'36 To many non-Muslims the term jihad
connotes a violent struggle to exterminate one's enemies. According to
Islamic philosophyjihad does not require violence or a holy war. Jihad can
be accomplished by "[t]he heart, the tongue, and the hands, as well as the
sword."' 37 In fact, it is possible to speak of an internaljihad to rid yourself of
your inner passions and imperfections." Both the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Takfir Groups believe that they must engage injihad to return Egypt to the
shari'ah. They differ on whether thejihad they wage is with the sword or with
the heart.
In Islamic fundamentalism, the political goals of a group are strictly laid
out by the precepts of Islam, while the path to those goals, or the type ofjihad
that must be waged, is in large part dictated by the political realities that face
the group. The Muslim Brotherhood's political participation has been
characterized by a strategy of moderation, gradualism, and a willingness to
work within Egypt's constitutional framework.'39 From 1928 until its conflict
with Nasser in 1954, the Brotherhood was much more likely to support
movements that challenged the political mainstream. During World War II,
135. See Christopher Ford, Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Lawv and Islam's
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it led demonstrations against the government 4" and gave vital support to
Nasser and the military in overthrowing the government.' The imprisonment
of the leaders of the Brotherhood in 1954 until 1970 took a great toll on the
group and had a profound effect on its tactics. When they were released, the
leaders spoke out more vehemently against the overthrow of the government.
Sixteen years in prison and the execution of countless numbers of their
comrades taught the Brotherhood that it was better to work within existing
political frameworks instead of attacking the government. In the first
multiparty elections in 1976, Brotherhood leaders ran for elected positions
with great success. In the elections of 1984 and 1987 it constituted the largest
opposition group.
14
1
The Brotherhood's shift toward the political mainstream also made it more
popular in the eyes of many Egyptians. The 1980s witnessed the increasing
Islamitization of Egyptian society. Many people rejected the ideas of modern
liberalism and sought to return to the tenets of Islam. Most of the radical
Islamic Takfir Groups were not accessible to the public. They resided in small
cells to protect themselves from being infiltrated by the government. The
Muslim Brotherhood had become the only significant Islamic organization that
was accessible to the public. It monopolized the public's hunger for a return
to Islam. The years of experience in managing political affairs during the
administrations of Sadat and Mubarak created a leadership group that was
prepared to take advantage of the opportunities that the late 1980s and 1990s
provided. 43
IV. THERAVADA BUDDHIST FUNDAMENTALISTS IN SRI LANKA
The Theravada Buddhist fundamentalist movement differs significantly
from the haredi Jewish groups and the Muslim Brotherhood in that Theravada
fundamentalists are intimately intertwined with ethnic nationalism. While the
haredim and the Muslim Brotherhood shun nationalism, Theravada
fundamentalists have incorporated a strong nationalist element into their
ideology. Sri Lanka is divided among two ethnic groups. Seventy-five
percent of the fifteen million people that live on the island are Sinhalese
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Buddhists. The remaining twenty-five percent are either Muslim or Hindu
Tamils.'" Sri Lanka has a long and proud Buddhist past. In the third century
BC, missionaries from Indian King Asoka brought Theravada Buddhism to Sri
Lanka. 4" Despite its long history, Buddhism in Sri Lanka has remained
remarkably similar to the original Theravada strain brought to the island.'
Basic to Theravada Buddhism is the distinction between the false mundane
world of the ordinary senses and the transmundane reality attained through
overcoming one's desires and ambitions. 7 Also central to the Theravada
tradition is the concept of karma-an inexorable law of cause and effect which
rewards bad or good acts by an actor with equally bad or good acts against
him.'" Karma is the moral calculus at the center of a morally just universe that
rewards the good and punishes the evil. The Buddhist ethic that lays out
appropriate behavior is contained in the dhamma and the vinaya.'49 The
dhamma focuses on the domain of legislation and social organization and
applies to both monks and lay people, while the vinaya deals mostly with rules
for the monks or sangha.'50 The different parts of the ideal Buddhist
community are held together in a reciprocal and interlocking relationship with
the state.'' The state provides national defense and internal order, while the
sangha provide a moral exemplar for the people and advise the state on
implementing the dhamma to ensure the state's legitimacy.' The Buddhist
monarchy was based on the concept of righteousness. To maintain his political
authority, the king was required to follow the dhamma. If he did not maintain
his authority, the social and physical well-being of his people would be in
danger.' If the king did not follow the dhamma the people had a right to
overthrow him, therefore, it was imperative that the king worked with the
sangha to faithfully implement the dhamma.
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In 1505, the Portuguese landed on Sri Lanka and in 1656 the Dutch
replaced them.' In 1796, the British took over and they vigorously set about
to control the island. While the Portuguese and Dutch had only controlled the
coast, the British attempted to conquer the whole island, and in 1815 they
deposed the final remnant of Sinhalese independence, the King of Kanday.'"
In addition, the British worked to solidify their rule by undermining the
traditional position of Buddhism in Sinhalese society. The British privileged
Christian converts in the government civil service, and they set up a state run
educational system that removed the sangha from their traditional place as
educators, weakening the ties between the monks and the laity.'57 Upwardly
mobile Sinhalese found it desirable, if not necessary, to drop their Sinhalese
culture and Buddhist traditions.'
In the 1890s the charismatic leader Anagarika Dharmapala rose to fill the
vacuum created by the abandonment of Sinhalese culture. Dharmapala
formulated a simplified Buddhist ideology aimed almost exclusively at
restoring national pride as opposed to strict religious orthodoxy. 59
Dharmapala used a select retrieval of norms from canonical Buddhism. He
formulated a code of lay conduct that emphasized moral purity and etiquette
in the family and most importantly, he looked to the past glories of Sinhalese
culture as described in the Buddhist chronicles to foster a new nationalist
identity."W Dharmapala's new vision of Buddhism has often been called
"Protestant Buddhism" because it mimicked many of the tactics of the
Protestant missionaries then working in Sri Lanka. 6' Dharmapala believed the
Sinhalese could overcome the exploitation at the hands of the British and the
economically powerful Tamils if they worked hard, were thrifty, and civilized
themselves. 62 Drawing from the Protestant work ethic, Dharmapala rejected
the idea of the monk as being the central link to enlightenment and instead
encouraged a spiritual egalitarianism which emphasized individual
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responsibility and self-scrutiny. 63 Because religion was universalized, it
applied to all people in all contexts. It was the duty of the Sinhalese Buddhist
to spread Buddhism and permeate their whole society with it.'" Dharmapala's
efforts to simplify and demystify Buddhism appealed greatly to a new class of
educated Sinhalese businessmen, civil servants, and professionals who felt
stifled under English rule.
In 1933, Dharmapala died. However, in 1934, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike
replaced him as the informal head of Sinhalese Buddhist revivalism by
forming the conservative political group Sinhala Maha Sabha (SMS).'65 In
1931, the British government allowed universal adult franchise, and the SMS
soon became the party representing Sinhalese interests." Despite the newly
acquired right to vote, political participation was relatively low until Sri
Lankan independence and the first general election in 1947.67 In the late
1940s, the SMS and the other political leaders who had come together to fight
for independence formed the United National Party (UNP) for the purpose of
forming the first parliamentary government."6  Under the auspices of
encouraging stability, the English observers pushed the upper class Anglicized
elite to the leadership of the government and left the other leaders out.69 The
new government sought to balance the various religious and ethnic interests
in the country, which only alienated the Sinhalese nationalists. In 1951,
Bandaranaike and the SMS broke away from the UNP and formed the Sri
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP).' 71
In 1956, labor troubles, economic dislocation, and the rhetoric of the
Sinhalese nationalists swept Bandaranaike and the SLFP into power.'1 '
Bandaranaike was elected on a pro-Buddhist, pro-Sinhalese ticket, promising
to make Sinhalese the national language and Buddhism the national religion.'72
He astutely realized that the needs of the middle class were not met by the
liberal, pluralistic UNP, so he shaped his platform to their needs. With the end
of the colonial government in 1947, considerable economic and social change
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was expected from the government. There was a resurgence in the study of
classic Sri Lankan history, and the middle class looked more and more to Sri
Lanka's pre-colonial past for guidance."" The resulting frustration with the
lack of development under the UNP only fueled the fires of ethnic nationalism.
Furthermore, the Sinhalese were invigorated by a strange millennialism
surrounding the 2,500 year anniversary of the birth of the Buddha." 4 Many on
the island had come to believe that the celebration was the beginning of a new
era of Buddhist resurgence led by Bandaranaike and the SLFP." 5
The first legislation the Bandaranaike government submitted was a
proposal to make Sinhalese the official language of the country."6 Because of
political realities, Bandaranaike was forced to compromise with the Tamil
minority in parliament.'" The compromise enraged the radical United Monks
Front who staged massive demonstrations against the compromise and
eventually forced Bandaranaike to take a hard line against the Tamils."" The
Tamils flooded the streets in protest in what became known as the Language
Riots of 1957.79 In these first ethnic riots after Sri Lankan independence, the
damage was light compared to the scale of destruction that was to occur in the
near future.'"
In the 1970s and 1980s, Sri Lanka became increasingly authoritarian and
economically and socially divided. In 1977, the UNP party was elected to
power under the guidance of J. R. Jayawardena.' The UNP reversed the
socialist policies of the SLFP and moved toward a strict market-oriented
economy.' The new economic policies created greater economic disparity as
the wealthy capitalists became increasingly rich and the rural poor slipped
further into poverty. The UNP also discriminated heavily against the Tamils.
During the agricultural development projects in the Dry Zone, Sinhalese
peasants were given most of the land in an area that the Tamils considered
their homeland.'83 In response to Tamil protests, Jayawardena became
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increasingly authoritarian. In the October 1982 parliamentary elections, the
UNP won fifty-two percent of the vote. Unsatisfied with the extent of the
UNP's majority, Jayawardena declared the election invalid and reshuffled the
election returns to distance the opposition and solidify his own position. 4
Jayawardena tried to further protect himself and justify his authoritarian
behavior with fundamentalist Buddhist ideals. Jayawardena promised to
implement a society focused on the dhamma, thereby making an attack on him
equal to an attack on those lofty Buddhist principles." 5
During the 1970s and 1980s, the radical Tamils began to organize
paramilitary groups, like the Liberation Tigers, for the purpose of an armed
attempt at establishing an independent homeland." Throughout the two
decades, these groups clashed with state security forces. During the elections
of 1981, Tamil groups disrupted polling places and the army responded with
arrests and violent reprisals.as" In 1983, tensions came to a head when thirteen
Sinhalese soldiers were ambushed by Tamil rebels and killed."" The Sinhalese
populace took to the streets in the largest riots of Sri Lanka's history. Between
350 and 2,000 people were killed and close to 100,000 were left homeless by
the riots."9 In the years that followed, the violence only escalated as the Tamil
rebels began to attack civilians and sacred sites." In 1987, India was forced
to step in, signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and bringing 55,000 Indian
troops to the island to control the violence."'
The case of Theravada Buddhist fundamentalists differs from the cases
involving the haredi Jews and the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead of religious
fundamentalism driving the movement for the Sinhalese Buddhists,
nationalism catalyzes the movement and religion is simply the moral
justification. In a world of scarce resources, it is necessary that nationalist
movements employ a moral justification for taking possession of the land or
exerting control over those who currently inhabit it. To defend their claim
against competing groups, nationalists must construct an independent moral
justification that will help explain why they deserve the land others claim."re
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For Sinhalese nationalism, the fundamental tenants of Buddhism provide
the required moral justification. Dharmapala and other Sinhalese nationalists
recognized the strong role Buddhism could play in a national reawakening. Sri
Lankan Theravada Buddhism was arguably one of the purest strains of
Buddhism in the world. Brought over from India in the third century BC, it
remained largely uninfluenced by other religious and political movements as
compared to Buddhism in other Asian countries. 93 In addition to its purity,
Theravada Buddhism played an important role in the powerful Sinhalese
dynasties that ruled Sri Lanka before colonial intervention in the sixteenth
century.' Any nationalist group that looked back to the Sinhalese golden age
would recognize the importance of Buddhism in their nationalist rhetoric.
Most importantly, as a religion, Buddhism provides the ideal moral
justification. Instead of appealing to often changing notions of right and
wrong that spring from modem ideologies such as Marxism or Western
liberalism, Sinhalese nationalists could look to the ancient Buddhist cannons
to support their cause.
V. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL
FUNDAMENTALISM
One of the paramount concerns of the ruling elite in a government is
political legitimacy. A government acquires legitimacy when the citizens of
a nation believe that the political institutions of the country are right and
proper and that the government's decisions and rules should be accepted and
obeyed. Therefore, it is imperative that the government try to maximize its
legitimacy, since political legitimacy allows the government to achieve its
goals without resorting to violence or coercive pressure.'95 Legitimacy may be
derived from two possible sources, consummatory values and instrumental
values. Consummatory values are derived from moral principles, often found
in the traditions or religion of the culture." Consummatory values can
probably best be expressed as the moral justification for supporting the state.
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Instrumental values, however, are derived from the government's ability to
provide for the economic and social well-being of the people." While
instrumental values indicate the ability of the government to provide for its
people, consummatory values represent the group solidarity that brings people
to embrace the government as their own.'98
All political opposition groups, whether they be fundamentalist or secular,
challenge the legitimacy of the ruling political apparatus. Boiled down to its
most basic elements, fundamentalist efforts to control legal systems are an
effort to weaken the legitimacy of the existing political structure. While most
political opposition groups challenge a government's instrumental values or
its success in providing for the social and economic well-being of the people,
religious fundamentalists are unique in that they spend most of their energy
challenging the consummatory values of a government and its political
institutions. Fundamentalists who are not part of the ruling political apparatus
challenge the moral and traditional underpinnings of the nation's laws. They
directly attack the legitimacy of the state and try to show how the state would
be more legitimate if it was molded according to certain religious precepts.
An excellent example of this kind of activity can be seen among the haredi
Jews in Israel. Many haredim vehemently oppose the secular state of Israel.
They believe that only God can bring the Jews out of exile and any human
attempt to hasten God's work is heresy.'" As a result, the haredim constantly
challenge the legitimacy of the government by trying to avoid contact with it.
The reactionary group Neturei Karta even refuses to participate in national
elections and has sought to aid the PLO during the Middle East peace talks.'
The haredim make few statements addressing social or economic issues, but
instead center their political activity on keeping the Zionist state from
contaminating their communities.
Fundamentalist groups have difficulty in challenging the legitimacy of
governments because they usually represent only a small minority of the
population. Governments seek to maximize legitimacy by appealing to a large
segment of the population. Fundamentalist groups espousing ideas that are
vastly different from the ideology of the majority find it difficult to attain
widespread support to challenge the political status quo and implement their
197. See id.
198. Suksamran, supra note 149, at 108.
199. Heilman & Friedman, supra note 29, at 234.
200. MARTY & APPLEBY, supra note 1, at 97.
[Vol. 5:263
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND LEGAL SYSTEMS
own political agenda. Again, the haredim provide an excellent example of the
problems fundamentalist groups can encounter. The haredim have taken a
very contentious position in challenging the Zionist state. To most Israelis and
Jews around the world, Israel is a sign of independence and national pride,
especially after the displacement and destruction caused by the Holocaust. In
the wake of haredi election success in 1988, several mass demonstrations were
held calling for reform of the electoral system to minimize the haredi influence
in the government."' Many secular Jews were worried that because the haredi
parties were needed to form a coalition government, they would be allowed to
dictate the course of the Israeli state.'0 In addition to their political activity,
many Israelis also disagree with haredi extra-political activities as well.
Israelis object strongly to the physical intimidation and economic sanctions
used by the haredim to drive other Jews from their neighborhoods.3 While
some Israelis may be concerned about the haredi influence, they should realize
that until the haredim moderate their response and attempt to endear
themselves to a greater section of the public they will not have any major
impact on the Israeli state.
Fundamentalists are aware that their message often does not appeal to a
wide enough audience, but they frequently adapt by popularizing their
message to help attract a larger portion of the population. In spite of their
emphasis on tradition, one should not believe that fundamentalists are
inflexible. While they may call for the absolute authority of texts or ritual,
fundamentalist realize that they live in a worldwide marketplace of ideas,
where they must compete with other ideologies for the hearts and souls of the
people. The Muslim Brotherhood provides an excellent example of the
adaptability of fundamentalist movements. In the Brotherhood's infancy,
Hasan al-Banna realized that the best way to reach out to the people of Egypt
was through social service. Before the Brotherhood sent a single candidate to
the National Assembly, it had a large network of primary schools, trade
schools, and hospitals.' These organizations put the Brotherhood in the
public eye and cast them in a positive light in the minds of the people. When
the Brotherhood decided it wanted to become a part of the political
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mainstream, it modified its tactics to broaden its appeal, reaching out to the
educated middle class as well."
The Brotherhood also moderated its stance toward political violence. In
the 1950s, the Brotherhood was a more radical organization than it is now. In
1952, it helped overthrow the government and install Nasser, and a mere two
years later, a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser. 6
In the 1970s, when many Islamic fundamentalists were flocking to violent
radical sects, the Brotherhood tempered its radicalism, realizing that it was not
in its best interest to advocate violence. First, violence only hurt the people of
Egypt and made the government expend money to contain it.' Second,
violence always resulted in arrests or executions, which tended to hurt the
leadership of the group and drive the rest of the group underground.08 The
Brotherhood recognized that it could achieve its goals by taking a more
moderate stance and working within the mainstream political channels.
Whether a fundamentalist group will choose to popularize its ideology is,
in most part, dictated by its underlying goals and world view. The haredim
have been very static and absolute in their ideology because they have taken
on a defensive enclave mentality, as opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood
which sees itself as actively leading all of Islam to a new golden age. The
world view adopted by a particular group is influenced in large part by the
fundamentals they choose to stress and is not inherent within the religion itself.
This helps to explain why the haredim, who are defensive and who try to
preserve their way of life, and the Gush Emunim, who are active and militant,
can both claim to be upholding the strict letter of Jewish law.
The fundamentals that a group selects are dictated for the most part by the
outside modernist threat and as a result also depend on the timing and the
conditions of the group's interaction and conflict with modernity. °9 Let us
return to the example involving the haredim and the Gush Emunim (GE). The
haredi Jewish movement grew during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in Europe and was created in response to the industrialization and migration
that were dispersing Jewish communities and moving more and more Jews
away from a life dedicated wholly to Judaism.21 The haredim responded to
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the fracture of their communities by creating Jewish enclaves and stressing the
ritual practices of their forefathers.2"' In contrast, the GE is a very recent
development, forming in the wake of the Six-Day War in 1967. '21 Members
of the GE believe that the conquest and settlement of the territory constituting
the biblical nation of Israel are necessary for redemption and can in fact hasten
the coming of the Messiah.' The GE is a response in large part to the Arab-
Israeli conflict and its periods of activity or dormancy can be traced to
corresponding periods of conflict or peace between the Arabs and Israelis.
2 4
Because the haredim and the GE arose at different times and under
different circumstances, their responses to modernity have been different as
well. The GE was formed during a time when the nations of the Middle East
were embroiled in armed conflict, so their tactics and methods have focused
on that conflict. By contrast, the haredim were formed during a time when
intellectual movements and social change were challenging the integrity of
Jewish communities. It is only natural that their tactics have centered around
the preservation of the Jewish community. In order then to predict the
direction of a fundamentalist group, it is necessary to investigate the forces
acting on it. If the region around the group is embroiled in ethnic conflict,
expect the group to choose those elements of its religion that allow it to best
cope in that environment. Only when you understand the context in which a
fundamentalist group arises can you hope to discover the path it plans to take.
Fundamentalist groups are also extremely vulnerable to state repression,
and their tactics and ideology can be influenced by repeated pressure from the
government. The Muslim Brotherhood is only one example of a group that has
been influenced by government pressure. The leadership of the Muslim
Brotherhood suffered greatly under the rule of Nasser. In 1954 and again in
1965, Nasser imprisoned and executed a great number of the Brethren." 5 This
act had a profound impact on the group. When the survivors were released
from prison by Sadat in 1970, they embraced a new pragmatism that advocated
working within the existing political system and avoiding violent opposition
to the government."6
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One of the most critical aspects of fundamentalism for the world
community to understand is the relationship between fundamentalism and
nationalism. Increasingly, nationalist movements are looking toward religious
fundamentalism to provide the moral justification for their movements." 7 As
discussed earlier, every nationalist movement must develop an independent
moral justification for the course of action it plans to take-whether it be
securing an independent homeland or taking control of existing political
structures."' Religion provides the ideal moral justification for nationalists
because religions are not only well respected and acknowledged moral
systems, but are often intertwined with a nation's history. As a result, religion
can serve as an effective rallying point for nationalist feelings.
In the case of nationalist movements, the fervor of nationalism supplants
fundamentalism, making fundamentalism subservient to it. When nationalism
harnesses fundamentalism, fundamentalism is no longer the driving force
behind the movement, but instead is used by the nationalists in their drive
toward solidifying their national identity. The search for national identity, not
religious truth, is primary, and it conditions the fundamentals stressed and how
they are used. The fundamentals extracted from sacred texts or rituals are
more reflective of the nationalist rhetoric than any particular religious world
view. In other words, the religious character of the texts or rituals is
subservient to the personal identity affirmed by the religious items. In these
movements, cultural identity is transformed into a religious fetish that takes on
sacred and magical properties of its own.2" 9
To further illustrate this point, take for example the Theravada Buddhist
fundamentalists in Sri Lanka. Dharmapala, the first Sinhalese nationalist, tried
to simplify Buddhist ideology while stressing Sinhalese cultural achievement
under the Buddhist kings. His view differed from traditional Buddhist practice
in several key areas. He sought to reduce the influence of the monks and
instead emphasized individualism and self-reliance. Most importantly, in his
attempt to simplify Buddhism, he removed much of the philosophical
complexity and ritual variety in the religion. By stressing the core teachings,
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he ignored the essential dynamic between the mundane and the transmundane
that was at the center of Buddhism.22° He replaced the philosophical center of
Buddhism that supported the core teachings with nationalist rhetoric that
incorporated the core ideas into a broader context of ethnic renewal.
Dharmapala shunned local folk traditions, but he embraced the major Buddhist
pilgrimages and festivals because they served to reinforce Sinhalese national
identity.22" ' To Dharmapala, it was not the content of the festivals that
warranted concern, but whether the festivals would detract from the "worship"
of the Sinhalese nation-state.
Obviously it becomes important to distinguish between those
fundamentalist movements that are standing on their own and those that form
part of a larger nationalist program. Those movements, like the Muslim
Brotherhood and the haredi Jews, that are not part of any nationalist movement
are going to be centered around a religious world view as opposed to any
nationalist rhetoric. The fundamentals they stress will center around personal
salvation and purity, and they will look to a future that is more righteous and
holy than the times we live in now. Fundamentalist movements that have been
captured and exploited by nationalist movements stress different elements.
They look to religious texts and rituals that are going to solidify national unity
and provide the moral justification for their claims. They are not as concerned
with living life in line with divine mandate, as much as they are solidifying
cultural superiority.
Another issue of particular interest is the relationship between
fundamentalist groups and violence. Initially one might believe that
fundamentalist groups would be against violence; religions generally tend to
abhor violent conflict and the killing of other human beings. Fundamentalist
groups are adaptable though, and almost any religious text can be interpreted
to allow violent conflict with an evil outside force. The crucial factor that
determines whether a fundamentalist group will resort to violence is whether
the country they inhabit is a sectarian or secular state.' In a sectarian state,
like Iran, Egypt, or Sri Lanka, there are many partial communities, including
communities based on ethnicity, nationalism, and religion.' 3  Although
fundamentalist groups almost always begin as a peripheral element, the
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religious communities share crucial basic beliefs that allow the fundamentalists
to recruit members from the mainstream and interact with those religious
communities in power.2 24 Because fundamentalists can draw on the core
values of the larger religious communities, their potential for influence is
greater.
The patterns and forms that religious violence takes in a sectarian state
depend on whether the state contains a dominant religious community.2 In
countries like Sri Lanka, where there is a dominant religious community,
fundamentalists will resort to intense and persistent violence to achieve their
goals. Fundamentalists surrounded by a dominant religious community have
a broader base from which to derive support and are better able to wage a
destructive and prolonged engagement against their enemies. In countries like
Egypt, where the religious community is not as powerful, fundamentalists
engage in violence that is only sporadic and occasional because they lack the
support from a large portion of the population.16 This distinction between
nations that have dominant or nondominant religious communities helps to
explain why Sri Lanka has had almost constant violence since 1956, while
Egypt has experienced assassinations but little communal bloodshed.
In secular nation-states like Israel and the United States the major religious
communities that feed fundamentalist groups have much less political potential
than their counterparts in sectarian states." As a result, fundamentalists in
secular states must pursue limited political concerns in ways by which they can
obtain secular support. 8 An example is the methods the Israeli haredim
utilize in securing political concessions from the government. The haredim
realize that they cannot exert substantial political pressure, so they wait until
the political mainstream needs them to form a coalition government and then
present their concerns. In a secular state the goal of overtaking the state is
simply not credible, so fundamentalist groups must use other means. The
resulting pattern that can be discerned from this dichotomy makes it important
to determine what kind of political system a nation employs. If a
fundamentalist group resides in a sectarian state that has a dominant religious
community, the group will be much more likely to resort to violence than if it
resides in a secular nation-state.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Fundamentalists, perhaps better than most groups, realize the strange
relationship between law and power. On one hand, law is power's voice that
legitimizes its brute force; on the other hand, power is law's indispensable
condition without which law has no legitimacy or muscle. 229 Any movement
in the modern era realizes that in order to control its destiny it must be able to
manage power and legal systems. If it does. not, it exists at the will of outside
decisionmakers. Fundamentalists are aware that they must control law and
legal systems in order to achieve their goals, but they also are aware that
without the support of the populace any legal system they create will lack
legitimacy. It is important to remember that fundamentalist groups are
extremely diverse and adaptable. Because they represent a reaction to
modernity they are going to meld and bend in ways that allow the group to
best cope in the modern era. Fundamentalists are never static and to see them
as such is an underestimation of their power and persuasiveness.
Fundamentalists understand the correlation between law and power and the
role they play in a modern nation-state.
To most outside observers, the most troubling aspects of fundamentalist
movements are their ties to nationalism and violence. Fundamentalism
maintains a strange relationship with nationalist movements. While in most
contexts, the fundamentals extracted from a religion stand on their own as the
core beliefs of the group, in nationalist movements the fundamentals extracted
are more in tune with national identity than any discernible spiritual or
religious view. Fundamentalist religion provides an excellent moral
justification for nationalism. The absolute character of religious truth
espoused by fundamentalists can be easily directed toward cultural identity,
making national identity an absolute as well. It is only natural that the
nationalist leaders would look toward fundamentalist tactics to aid their
groups.
The relationship between violence and fundamentalist groups has much to
do with the character of the nation in which they reside. Because
fundamentalist groups are religious groups, they are going to be greatly
influenced by the role religious communities take in managing the state. If a
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fundamentalist organization resides in a sectarian nation that has very vocal
and powerful religious communities, the organization is more likely to resort
to violence. If the fundamentalist organization resides in a secular nation-state
that distances religious groups from the decisionmaking process, then
fundamentalist groups are going to resort to much less violence.
Fundamentalist violence then depends little on the religion or socioeconomic
status of its members, but is much more keenly influenced by a religious
group's access to the political and decisionmaking apparatus. The natural
question arises of whether fundamentalist groups will continue to exist in our
global culture that continually attempts to homogenize religion and ethnicity.
As long as the forces of modernization and the uneven political, social, and
economic growth that come with it exist, there will be fundamentalist groups.
Only when our societies stabilize and are able to provide the solid footing so
many people crave will fundamentalism disappear.
